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I. I~vTR~DUCTI~N 
The classical type of assignment problem introduced by von Neumann [lo] 
considers that an individual performs just one job in the set of tasks. Here a 
person cannot divide his time in performing different jobs. 
It is natural to extend such a problem in a more general context as explained 
above, that is to say, allowing division of the job intensity. Moreover, it is also 
interesting to consider not just an objective function to be maximized as in 
the von Neumann problem, but a utility function for each player, in particular 
one for the owner of the factory or business. Thus, we have a strategy game and 
the equilibrium point turns out to be a suitable concept to apply. 
In the first section we introduce the general problem and the existence of a 
general equilibrium point. The next section considers some properties. 
The third section studied equilibria computing obtained by a special technique 
by beginning with equilibrium points in the assignment game obtained by 
fixing a strategy of the owner. For this we introduce a general adapting procedure 
which conceptually is related to the very important adaptive processes introduced 
and studied by Bellman and Dreyfus [I]. 
In the final section some special cases are considered. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE MIXED ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM 
AND THE EXISTENCE OF SOLUTION 
As we mentioned in the Introduction, here we are going to present and 
describe the mixed assignment problem. This problem is conceptually related 
to von Neumann’s assignment problem [IO]. 
Let us consider two nonempty fixed sets of persons and jobs, I and J, respec- 
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tively. Each person i E I has a working capacity s(i) which is a nonnegative real 
number. Now a mixed assignment is a vector x E EPx% such that 
gl xij G 44 
for each i E 1 with x >, 0. Here m indicates the cardinality of set I and E that 
of J. The amount xij is the total work to be done in the job j E J by the person 
-i E 1. The condition just described is completely clear. 
Let xi E W be the vector xi = (xi1 , xi2 ,..., xin) and consider the strategy set 
for person i E I: 
Xi = Xi E BP: Xi >, 0, i Xij < s(i), . 
1 
i 
j=l I 
On the other hand, if in the mixed assignment problem we also consider a 
further person on player wz + 1, who may be seen as the owner of the job 
distribution, then his strategy set will be described as 
X m+l = (Y E E-P: 0 < Y(j) < c(j)>. 
Here c(j) is interpreted as the maximum job capacity in the job indexed by j. 
The variable r(j) h c osen by the owner is going to be the desired total amount 
of work in job j E J. 
The actual choice of y(j) can be related to the expansion, market situation, 
etc. I regarding several economic features. But in order to avoid economic 
complications in this first study on the subject we do not explicitly consider 
such matters. 
Thus, we introduce the set of all possible constrained assignments as 
We now have a simple property. 
LEMMA 1. For any Y, f E X,,, , and X E [0, 13 
V(X7 + (1 - X)F) = hV(r) f- (1 - A) V(F) 
and consequentEy V(y) is a nonempty corwer set. 
Proof. For given y, f E- Xnl+l , and h E LO, I], consider an x in V(XY T (1 - X>Fj, 
Therefore 
2 xij < /b(j) T (1 - h) F(j). 
i=l 
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From here, define 
when Y(j) $ f(j) > 0 
with i = Y, I: and j = I,..., n. If r(i) r f=-(i) Q 0, let xi; = xii = 0. Thus, from 
here, we have 
if r(j) -1 i;(j) =: 0 
In other words, .x$ E V(f) and 
x ==hx’.f(l -A)x’. Q.E.D. 
All the possible actions among the players are described by the set 
v = ((I, V(r)): Y E X,,,) c )( xi c wx+“. 
i=l 
Hy the propcrty given in the previous lemma, it turns out that the nonempty 
set I/ is also convex. 
Xow, if each player i = I,..., m L 1 has a puyoflfunction associated with the 
global actions among the players, they will face a competitive situation in the 
wide sense of game theory. 
Let ICI ,..., E,,, be the payoff function of first m players and iln,&i the corrc- 
sponding one for the owner, rcspectivcly. Therefore, the mixed assignment 
m 1 1 “game” will bc given h! 
I’ = (Xl ,..., A,,, , X,,,+l; E, ,..., &, , 1 4nl.H; v> 
where Xi are the strategy srts and I$ and A,,,., the payoff functions, all defined 
on the set of all possible joint actions V. 
Such a game is a V-generalized gauze as introduced in [4]. At this point we 
remark that although such a game has a great resemblance to the important 
generalized games introduced by Dcbreu [3], they are slighly different. 
A given joint action (2, ?) L: I/, will determine the possible sets ot new per- 
missible actions, namely, 
V,(.s^, +)= {Xi E xi: (kl )..., iYml ) xi , ii?&, ),..) qn ) Y) E V}, 
V,n+l(x, f) I:= {Y c- X,,, 1: (2, Y) 6 V> L- i [Fl -fici3 , c(j)] . 
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Therefore, it is natural to ask that a solution of the mixed assignment problem 
be a V-equilibrium point of the V-generalized game. That is to say, a point 
.- x1 ,...: x, , f) E Y such that 
and 
The interpretation of this concept was originated by Nash [f;] for non- 
cooperative games, and by Debreu [3] for generalized games and [4] for V- 
generalized games. For a complete account we recommend the books of Burger 
[2], Owen 171, Parthasarathy and Raghavan [S], and Rapoport [9]. 
We need the existence of such an equilibrium point. This is given in the 
following general result which is a particularization of the general existence 
theorem given in [4]. For this reason we just state it. 
THEOREM 2. Let F be the mixed assignment V-generalized game. If the payojf 
j%mctions Ei and A,+1 ave continuous in V arzd concave in xi E V.&X, ?) and 
I’ E Vm,l(~, F), Yespectively, then there exists at least one V-e-eguilibGm point of r. 
3. SOME SOLUTIONS' PROPERTIES 
In this section, we will study some interesting properties of the solutions by 
means of the V-generalized equilibrium point of the n-person V-generalized 
games describing the interactive and competitive interaction among the players 
in the assignment problem. 
First, we need to introduce the special payoff function into the assignment 
problem. From an intuitive point of view it is cIear that the utility of a working 
person has to be in some way measured by the total amount of work done. 
Thus, it is natural to consider 
mx, 7.,*, x, r) = f Ai(j, Y) xij fi(xl I..., xi-1 , xifl ,...I x, , Y), 
j=l 
where the &(j, Y) can be interpreted from an economic point of view as the 
pay for the unit of work of type j when the owner uses the policy given by the 
strategy r. Here from an economic point of view fi may measure the inter- 
dependence among the players and in some sense takes into consideration the 
cooperative tendency. 
We note that in the case where all the Ai, Ami are strictly negative and 
Ji > 0, the point (O,..., 0) is a solution. This case corresponds to the situation 
where the more the working persons work, the less they get. Similarly for the 
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owner. Therefore, for this somewhat unreal situation the solution becomes 
transparent. 
Thus, it is somewhat clear to consider all the A, and f i strictly positive. From 
now on, unless we express the contrary, we assume it. In such a case by the 
previous theorem there always exists an equilibrium point when A,;1 is con- 
cave in Y. Moreover we have: 
PROPOSITION 3. Let E be the set of equilibrium points of the assignment game r. 
If (3, Y) E E, then if 
(4 g1 6) d 5 w then 2 T$ = s(i) for each i = l,..., m. 
j=l 61 
If 
(b) 2 s(i) b f f(i) 
m 
then c stj = r(j) foreachj = I,..., n. 
i=l i=l i=l 
Proof. First, we consider the first case. Suppose there is an z such that 
Cz, xii < S(Z). Then, there existj, ,j, ,...,jk such that 
From here, we have that 
Indeed, this comes from the fact that 
Now, let l jt > 0 such that 
which is always possible to choose, since (1). Using the E’S define 
q zz xii ) ifi or i=Z and j#jl,...,jk 
= xij, + Ej, , 
. _ z = z and t: l,..., k. 
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Immediately, we have that 
on the other hand 
Thus, LF E V(‘). But 
since Ai > 0 and some components of xi’ are strictly greater than the corre- 
sponding of that of z{. On the other hand, we have that %:e E V,(X, F). 
This is impossible since (55, Y) is an equilibrium point. Therefore the case (a) 
is proved. 
Now the proof of the case (b) is similar. Consider that there is a j such that 
x2, SZij < r(j), then there exist i, ,..., i, such that ~~=, Q < s(i,). 
Thus, it is easy to see that 
Let eit , such that 
and 
which exist by virtue of condition (2). 
;“cTow define 
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This matrix 3, satisfies 
j Sj, 
and 
m 2 
= 2 %ij + C Eit = F(j), 
j =+A 
i=l t=1 
i # il ,..., i, , 
which implies that F< E V(F) or ?c:~ E &(F, F). But this point has a component 
strictly greater than that corresponding to 4, , but 
which is absurd by the definition of equilibrium point of (3, F) E E. Q.E.D. 
4. COMPUTING EQUILIBRIA 
Having this result, we now wish to introduce a procedure for computing some 
equilibrium points. In order to present it, consider the competitive situation 
arising among the workers when an owner’s strategy a is given, say, F. This 
situation is described by the V(F)-generalized game 
r,(f) = (X, ). .., x, ) Efy., f) ,..., EZ(., r); V(F)>. 
We can construct the equilibrium points of .F beginning with the knowledge 
of the corresponding of I’(P) varying in a suitable way F. 
We are going to study it in some detail, but first we consider a general 
procedure for computing a class of V(f)-equilibrium points of mm(y). 
Let an arbitrary sequence of players in T,(F), i1 ,..., i, , which for simplicity 
we assume to be 1, 2,..., m. Now let x1 > 0 such that for each j 
and (3) 
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for each x1 E Y(s(l), Y). H ere the last set indicates all the points satisfying (3). 
Given F and ~r above, consider a strategy xa > 0 for the second player with the 
properties 
$r xzi ,( s(2) and gzj ,( r(j) - zr3 
for each j and (4) 
i 42(j, F, X,j b jJ A2 J y)x2.i 
,j=l jzl ( -* - 
for ail xa E Y(s(2), r - Sr). 
Now following in an inductive manner, the last step will be given by an 
X, E Y(s(m), F - xzi1 So) such that 
f 4n(j, r> Gzj >, 2 A 
j=l 
j=l VLLL 3 %u 
for all X, E Y(s(m), V - xzT1 - xi). It is clear that for the compactness of the 
corresponding Y’s a sequence of %r ,..., X; obtained in this way always exists. 
A sequence obtained by the previous procedure will be called simply adapting 
sequence. 
We now present the following 
LEIvIMA 4. .4ny simply adapting sequence 4 ,...; %m is an V(p)-equilihium 
point of T,,(f). 
Proof. We first will see that Z~ E r/,(X, ji). But this means that for each j, 
The first inequality is satisfied since C~ E Y(s(i), F - xi:‘, %& 
The second one turns out from the fact that Z~ E Y(s(m), F- CL;” %J. 
l\ow since Y(s(i), P - CLii xk) 3 Yi(- -) x, Y an x, is chosen as the maximum in d 5. 
Y’s: 
for any xi E Vi(%, F), because f i > 0. Q.E.D. 
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It is interesting to note that the previous method used to obtain a simply 
adapting sequence for finding the equilibrium point for the game rm(~) can 
be easily generalized to a very broad one. Such a method as we will show else- 
where is surprisingly general and can be applied to many important real 
procedures of “accomodation” as, for example, the growth of a city. Con- 
ceptually this corresponds in essence to the very important adapting processes 
studied by Bellman and Dreyfus in [I]. 
Now we will present it. Consider a finite procedure where at each time I,..., p 
only one player enters a sequence. Therefore, if 1, C I is the set of players at 
time s, we have II1 / = 1 and 1 I, 1 3 2, since although only one player can 
enter, an arbitrary number of them can also go out, but there must remain at 
least one Iv = I. Moreover, the condition [ 1, 1 > 2 implies that always, in 
addition to the entering player, there is at least one other. 
We assume that each person can go out only a finite number of times. That 
is to say, for each i ~1 there are sr ,..., saci) such that i~1, and i $Is,+, for 
sa E Q(i) = (sl ,..., saci)}. As we have said, we have that for e&h s: l,...,p - 1, 
there is only one i E I such that i E 1,+1 and i 6 I, . Finally the personal choice is 
in such a way that the entering player will maximize his payoff in what all the 
already established players allow him. Technically, if i E I enters in the s step 
he will choose a strategy z?~ such that 
f xij < s(i) 
j=l 
and 
for all 
xi E Y 
c 
s(i), r - C x, . 
ue1, 1 
U#i 
We would like to mention that a player already belonging to I8 for some time 
has chosen his X, at the last time of entrance into the procedure. Thus, we have 
in this way a sequence 9 ,..., Z~ of all the players in I, . 
Such a sequence is called an adapting sequence. 
A simply adapting sequence is an adapting one. Indeed, consider 1, = {l}, 
I2 = {I, 2) ,...) I, = (I)..., m}. They fulfill all the requirements. 
The reader will realize that an adapting sequence, as we have already men- 
tioned, is conceptually very much related to the broad and very important 
concept of adapting process introduced and studied by Bellman and Dreyfus [l]. 
The only technical difference is that here we have many payoff functions (as 
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many as the number of players). Moreover, the final choice is an equilibrium 
point. In this way our adapting sequence might be seen as a generaiization. 
We remark that in an adapting sequence, if at a given time at least one player 
remains, this player is not allowed to change. This is due in fact to the first 
requirement, which says that a new player always enters and chooses, not the 
remaining player. 
The reason that we have chosen this way of defining an adapting sequence is 
due to the fact that if we allowed that only one person remains and he can 
change his strategy, then the process can be easily considered as beginning at 
that point in time. 
As we have already mentioned, we are now going to present the following 
result, the proof of which is very similar to that of Lemma 4 and therefore we 
do not repeat it. 
THEOREM 5. Any adapting sequence X; , .,. , X; is V(r)-equilibrium point of 
-r,,(y)* 
Thus, we have the set of all the equilibrium points obtained as adapting 
sequences. These are important since they are given constructively. 
Having the adapting sequences which determine equilibria in P,,(r), there are 
situations where equilibrium points in r can be constructed from those in 
cm 
Now we have the following general result which allows us to construct 
equilibrium points for certain classes of assignment problems. 
THEOREM 6. If fog each (x1 ,..., x, , r) E V, the payo$functions satisfy 
for all y1 > y2 such that (x, rl) and (x, ~a) E V. The f i are independent of T. Let 
- 
Xl >..., 5 be an equilibrium point in l-&(~). Then (zI , . . . , S& , a) where 
is an equilibrium point in T’. 
Proof. Given F, let %I ,..., X, be an equilibrium point in Fnl(“). Therefore 
lx - \ I >..i, xm 9 ?) E 1’. Construct P, then (F~ ,..., %m , Y;) E V by definition of f. On 
the other hand, we have 
for all I< E V(X, F), since such an Y satisfies Y >, F. Finally, for any i the same 
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inequality holds because, on the first hand, by definition of equilibrium point 
in P,(F), 
> 
[ 
f Ai(j, P) xij fyq ,...) ztiml ) %i+l )...) Li&) 
j=l I 
for each xi E Vi(r). On the other hand by the hypothesis 
> f Ai(j, P) s&j f”(x; )...) LEivl ) %i+l )..., ?&m> 
j=l I 
and finally V$(%, F) 3 V,(%, F) since F > P. Therefore 
Ef(%, F) > E,(q ,..., %i-l , xi, ziitl ,..., xm , 2) 
for each xi E I$(%, t). Q.E.D. 
We notice that in this case the point (O,..., 0) is an equilibrium point of r. 
This is somewhat pathological. However, many other equilibria exist and all 
those obtained using adapting sequences hold to equilibrium points. 
5. CHARACTERIZATION OF SOME EQUILIBRIA IN A SIMPLE CASE 
The last consideration of the preceding paragraph was a general case for 
constructing equilibria. This is a simple situation, where the equilibria of r,(f) 
determine equilibrium points in r with interesting properties. 
Let us consider an equilibrium point 5 in T!(F)-). In order to have (2, F) an 
equilibrium point in r, we therefore need to have 
for each Y E V,(a, F). 
If the payoff function of the owner is obtained as the sum of the utilities for 
each task, therefore analytically, we have 
where the utility functions ai are completely general. 
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Then the preceding condition can be restated as 
for each c 2 Y > E Here t(j) = Cc, S& . 
Now under condition (a) of Proposition 3, one can see easily that 
t E H(s) = /IE W”: f t(j) = si )
j=l 
where s = ci”=, s(i). 
Therefore, (2, “) is an equilibrium point of the assignment game r If and 
only if 
u(F) - U(Y) E H+(t) = (24 E Et”: 74 * t >, 0) 
for each t < P < c. 
Finally, we remark that by generalizing the concept of V-equilibrium point 
to those analogous to the E-generalized points as in [5], one can obtain in a 
specific case the natural generalization of von Neumann’s assignment problem 
with division in jobs. 
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